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FROM RIO TO KYOTO: A STUDY OF
THE INVOLVE:MENT OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS ON
CLIMATE CHANGE
CHIARA

GIORGETII*

lNTR.ODUCITON

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have acquired an
increasingly relevant status in the international policy arena.
This prominence can be seen in the expanded role of NGOs in
preparing and executing development projects,1 and in negotiating international legal agreements. NGOs also command influence at most levels of the international legal system, participate
in the implementation and monitoring of international conventions, and serve as experts 'in governmental delegations.2
This Article analyzes the influence of non-governmental actors on the negotiations of the Framework Convention on Cli-

* Program Officer, United Nations Development Programme (Somalia).
The author wishes to thank Robin Aram and Frits Hermans from Shell International in London, and Professor Richard B. Stewart from New York University
for their support and comments. The author would also like to thank Mark
Tamoshunas, Articles Editor at the N.Y. U. Environmental La111 Journal, for his
assistance. Portions of this piece, particularly Part ill, build upon an earlier
article published in the Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law.
See Chiara Giorgetti, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in tile Climate Change Negotiations, 9 CoLO. J. !NT'L ENVn.. L. & PoL'Y 115 (1998}.
1 About 41 o/o of the projects approved by the World Bank in Fiscal Year
1995 (FY 95) included provisions on NGOs (between 1973 and 1988 the average was six percent), and the Bank is committed to increasing communication
and cooperation with NGOs. Priorities include consultation on policy issues
and improvement in document dissemination, as well as new findings to
strengthen NGO sectors in borrowing countries. See WoRLD BANK, NGOs
AND THE BANK: INcoRPoRATING FY95 PROGRESS REPoRT ON CooPERATION
BETWEEN THE WoRLD BANK AND NGOs at i (1996).
z For example, in the discussion of the establishment of an International
Criminal Court, the presence of human rights NGOs has been constant and
valued. See Steve Chamovitz, Tlvo Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J.lNT'L L. 183,266 (1997).
201
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mate Change (FCCC or the Convention).3 In particular, it
evaluates the methods employed by NGOs in furthering their
substantive agendas, the interaction among various non-governmental actors, and the results of their efforts.
This Article considers two kinds of NGOs: business and environmental. Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) are the self-defined representatives of environmental interests. They campaign
for the strict reduction of all gases that induce climate change.
On the other side, business NGOs (BNGOs) typically represent
the interests of those industries that are involved in the industrial
cycles that damage the atmosphere. The analysis of the different
approaches and actions of these groups during the negotiations is
particularly interesting and relevant.· Given the conflicting missions of these two groups, one might believe that ENGOs and
BNGOs operate without regard to one another. In reality, business and environmental NGOs are not always completely separate entities. As this Article demonstrates, ENGOs and BNGOs
extensively scrutinize one another and frequently engage in official negotiations and discussions on various policy options.
I
THE REsPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The issue of climate change is a relatively recent development in the long history of international environmental negotiations. Between the 1950s and 1980s, awareness of the threats and
dangers of climate change began to emerge in the scientific community. It was only in the latter half of the 1980s, however, that
public and political interest in the dangers of climate change
arose. 4 In the 1990s, the threat of climate change became one of
the most discussed global environmental concerns.s
3 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter
FCCC].
4 See Daniel Bodansky, Prologue to the Climate Change Convention, in NE·
GOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE 45, 45-46 (Irving M. Mintzer & J. Amber Leonard eds., 1994).
s Climate change is the consequence of increased concentration of carbon
dioxide (C02) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere. In addition to C02, the most important GHGs are methane (Nlit), clorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), ozone (03), hydrofiuorocarbons (HFCs), perfiuorocarbons (PFCs), and
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). GHGs trap the sun's heat and keep it from escaping beyond the atmosphere of the Earth. C02 and other carbon-based sub-
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In 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), a group of approximately 1000 scientists working under
the aegis of the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), concluded
in their Second Assessment Report (SAR)6 that "the balance of
evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate."7 The SAR also concluded that in the last century the
mean temperature of the Earth rose by between 0.3 and 0.6 degrees Celsius and that the global sea level rose between ten and
twenty centimeters.8 For the end of the twenty-first century, the
SAR forecasted a sea level rise of between fifteen and ninety-five
centimeters and an average temperature increase of two degrees
Celsius.9
The Second Assessment Report also addressed the consequences of climate change. The report concluded that the projected increase in mean temperatures would have a significant
impact on physical and ecological systems, human health, and
socio-economic sectors. It projected that the change in temperature will occur at such a rapid rate that many ecosystems may not

stances are continuously exchanged between the atmosphere, the oceans, and
the biosphere. Carbon is crucial in the living environment, and it is fundamental for the vital cycle of animals, plants, and soil. Within this natural cycle, exchanges of C02 are many times greater than anthropogenic emissions of C<>t.
Yet, these natural exchanges are almost completely balanced. However, since
the beginning of this century and the onset of the industrial revolution, CO:
levels have been rising at the rate of four percent per decade. Many scientists
think that this increase is largely due to human activities, as it coincides with the
beginning of consistent and considerable C02 emissions from human-controlled
sources. Six-to-eight billion tons of carbon are produced annually by human
activities and deforestation. However, only about 3.4 billion additional tons
accumulate in the atmosphere each year. Scientists believe that the other threeto-four billion tons of carbon ("the missing carbon") are absorbed by the
oceans and land biosphere. Scientists need to address both the issue of the
missing carbon and the role of the oceans, together with a more thorough understanding of climatic patterns. See generally DAvm D. KEMP, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL IssUES 144-45 (2d ed. 1994); R. KERRY TURNER ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL EcoNol\ncs 268 (1993).
6 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Second Assessment Report (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.usgcrp.gov/ipcclhtmUSARwgii.html>
[hereinafter SAR].
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Srmrmary for Po/icymakers:
The Science of Climate Change-IPCC Working Group I § 4 (visited Feb. 16,
1999) <http://www.ipcc.ch/cc95/wgl.htm>.
s See id. § 3.
9 Seeid. § 5.
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have time to adapt. 10 Rising temperatures will also lead to a rise
in mortality and illness due to the increased number and intensity
of heat waves and the increased potential for the transmission of
tropical diseases.n
To control the consequences of climate change, the climate
system requires the adoption of long-term solutions. Many believe that, in conformity with the precautionary principle,12 actions should be taken to prevent the hazardous effects of climate
10 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers: Scientific-Technical Analyses of Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of
Climate Change-IPCC Working Group II § 4 (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://
www.ipcc.ch/cc95/wg2.htm>. Because of temperature increases, forests would
need to migrate to find a climate with characteristics that are simila.r to the ones
that are necessary for their survival, but forests can only migrate at a range of
about 4 to 200 kilometers per century. See id. The 1 to 3.5 degree Celsius
projected temperature increase would require forests to move 150 to 550 kilometers per century, which is well beyond their capacity. See id. Changes in
temperature will also bring negative consequences to other ecosystems.
Deserts are likely to become hotter but not wetter, and up to one half of existing mountain glacier mass could disappear. See id. Consequences to coastal
systems could include: erosion of shores and associated habitat, increased salinity of estuaries, altered tidal ranges in rivers and bays, and increased coastal
flooding. See id. The temperatures of oceans will increase, and this could alter
ocean circulation and reduce sea-ice cover. See id. Climate change will also
have an impact on regional freshwater resources and fisheries. Agriculture productivity will increase in some areas and decrease in others, like the tropics and
subtropics, even though global production probably could be maintained. Finally, climate change will affect human activities and settlements. Since a large
part of the population lives in coastal regions, a sea level increase of SO centimeters would put 92 million people at risk of flooding due to storm surges; a onemeter sea level rise would affect 118 million people. See id. Land loss will be
another consequence of sea level rise, with estimates ranging from 0.05% for
Uruguay, 1% for Egypt, and 17.5% for Bangladesh to about 80% for the Mar·
shall Islands. See id.
11 See id.
12 The precautionary principle is a principle of international law that implies
that states can decide to take action to protect the environment and prevent
environmental hazards despite the lack of full scientific certainty. Such actions
and measures would have a preventive and precautionary effect that would prevent serious or irreversible damage. The precautionary principle is founded on
the degree of scientific certainty necessary for action to be taken by the international community. See 1 PHILLIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES oF INTERNATIONAL EN·
VIRONMENTAL LAw 208-13 (1995). Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states
that "[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation." United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development: The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, June 13, 1992, princ. 15, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
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change. Preventive measures should not be postponed because
there is a lack of full scientific evidenceP
II
THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON

CLIMATE CHANGE

Two international conventions were opened for signature at
the second United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio in 1992: the FCCCI4 and the
Convention on Biological Diversity.15 UNCED was a fundamen. tal step toward tlie recognition of environmental concerns in national and international political arenas, and significantly
increased public concern and awareness of environmental issues.
UNCED represented the final phase of long and successful diplomatic negotiations on environmental issues. In Rio, the international community agreed on several important legal measures
to protect the environment, including the Rio Declaration (a
general statement of principles that takes into account the rights
and obligations of countries to the global environment),t6
Agenda 21 (an action plan for sustainable development),l' and a
Statement of Principles on Forests.18
At UNCED, nearly 1500 NGOs were accredited to attend
formal and some informal meetings. This gave NGOs the opportunity to lobby governmental representatives, present documents, and meet and form coalitions among themselves.19
Agenda 21 underlined the importance of the involvement of nongovernmental organizations during UNCED. For example, it
states that "[r]elevant non-governmental organizations . . .
See SANDs, supra note 12, at 208-13.
FCCC, supra note 3.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
16 Rio Declaration, supra note 12.
17 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Developmel!t, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex ll, Agenda Item 21, at 12, U.N. Doc. AI
CONF.151/26 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda Item 21].
18 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation
and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
881 [hereinafter UNCED].
19 See Ann Doherty, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in UNCED, in NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 199, 203·07 (Bertram
Spector et al. eds., 1994) (explaining the role of NGOs and reporting how
NGOs judged the entire process).
13
14
15

Ima ed with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

206

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 7

should be given opportunities to make their contributions and
establish ~ppropriate relationships with the United Nations sysM
tem." 20 The U.N. system, with consultation from NGOs, should
take measures to design a system of effective NGO participation,
take into account the findings of review systems and evaluation
processes of NGOs, and establish procedures for an expanded
role of NGOs in the implementation of Agenda 21.21
The adoption of the FCCC was the first step taken by the
international community to address the issue of global climate
change. The objective of the FCCC is to stabilize "greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would preM
vent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate sysM
tem." 22 As a minimum, the FCCC provides that all countries
should report a national inventory of "anthropogenic emissions
by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol."23 There are further comM
mitments for a party, depending upon the annex into which it is
classified.24 An Annex I nation must take "measures on the mitiM
gation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions
of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse
gas sinks and reservoirs" with the goal of returning "by the end
of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emisM
sions" of greenhouse gases (GHGs).25 In addition, Annex II parM
ties are to "take all practical steps to promote, facilitate and
finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmenM
tally sound technologies and know-how to other parties, particuM
larly developing country parties, to enable them to implement
Agenda Item 21, supra note 17, para. 38.42, at 467.
See id. para. 38.43, at 467.
22 FCCC, supra note 3, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854.
23 /d. art. 4.1(a), 31 I.L.M. at 855; see also Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.16, 1987,26 I.L.M.1550 (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol] (regulating the emissions of
CFCs).
24 Annex I (all countries listed) and Annex II(* only) Parties are the following: Australia*, Austria*, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada*, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark*, European Community*, Estonia, Finland*, France*, Germany*,
Greece*, Hungary, Iceland*, Ireland*, Italy*, Japan*, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux·
embourg*, the Netherlands*, Poland, Portugal*, Romania, Russian Federation,
Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Thrkey, the United Kingdom*, and the United
States*. Note that both the European Union and all its members are Parties of
the Convention. See FCCC, supra note 3, Annex I-II, 31 I.L.M. at 872-73.
25 /d. art. 4.2(a), 31 I.L.M. at 856.
20
21
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the provisions of the Convention."26 Annex IT parties should
also assist developing countries, parties that are particularly vulnerable to climate change, in "meeting costs of adaptation.''27
Further, these parties should provide "new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties" in complying \vith the obligation of
providing national inventories.28 Fmally, the FCCC introduces a
controversial policy measure, Joint Implementation (ll), that
would allow parties to the Convention to reduce GHG emissions
by financing or investing in reduction processes, such as cleaner
technologies, in another party.29
A. COPl: Berlin, March 1995
The first Conference of the Parties after Rio (COPl) was
held in Berlin in 1995 (one year after the Convention took effect)
as prescribed by FCCC Article 7.4.30
During COPl, there were two important developments. The
first was the establishment of the Berlin Mandate3t to negotiate
commitments on emissions after the year 2000. The Berlin Mandate recognizes that the commitments of the FCCC are not adequate and calls for the beginning of a process to strengthen the
commitments of Articles 4.2(a) and 4.2(b) \vith the aim of
"elaborat[ing] policies and measures" and setting '"quantified
limitation and reduction objectives \vithin specified time-frames,
Id. art. 45, 31 I.L.M. at 858.
Id. art. 4.4, 31 I.L.M. at 858.
28 Id. art. 43, 31 I.L.M. at 858; see also generally Daniel Bodansh-y, Tlze
United Nations Framework Convention 011 Climate Change: A Commentary, 18
YALE J. lNT'L L. 451 (1993) (summarizing and analyzing the Convention and
the negotiating process that led to the Convention).
29 See FCCC, supra note 3, art. 3.3, 31 I.L.M. at 854 (allowing parties to
address climate change with cooperative efforts). The definition of n is controversial and the Convention does not provide for a single interpretation. The
parties discussed and defined ll further during the Conferences of the Parties as
provided by FCCC Article 7.2, which states that the Conference of the Parties
shall make the necessary decisions to promote the effective implementations of
the Convention to facilitate "the coordination of measures adopted by them to
address climate change," id. art. 7.2, 31 I.L.M. at 860-61, and by Article 4.2(d),
which indicates that "the Conference of the Parties, at its fU'St session, shall also
take decisions regarding criteria for joint implementation." /d. art. 4.2(d), 31
LL.M. at 857.
30 See id. art. 7.4, 31 I.L.M. at 862.
31 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties: Decisions Adopted by the FU'St Session (Berlin), Mar. 28Apr. 7, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1671 [hereinafter Berlin Mandate].
26
27
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such as 2005, 2010 and 2020."32 The negotiations were to "begin
without delay" and to "be conducted as a matter of urgency."33
The second development at COPl was the parties' further debate
on Joint Implementation and introduction of a JI Pilot Phase,
which included Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ).34 The Pilot
Phase will last until the year 2000. AIJ will be implemented
among those Annex I parties and non-Annex parties that request
it.35
The Berlin Mandate is generally considered a mixed success.
The parties did not agree on a protocol as some had hoped. The
Mandate did, however, bring new developments and provided
needed vigor to the FCCC by proposing the discussion of a protocol with specific time frames to further develop the commitments of the Convention. The Mandate resulted in new, stronger
alliances among parties and a more decisive position of develop·
ing and developed countries in favor of or against commitments.36 The 'G77' alliance, a coalition of less-developed
nations, split into two groups. On one side was a new alliance
called 'G72,' which represented developing countries that favor
action to reduce emissions and legal commitments for developed
countries.37 The other side contained OPEC countries isolated in
their effort to block negotiations.38 There was a similar split
among developed countries, with the 'green' countries of Northem Europe supporting new stringent commitments, while the
32 Id. Decision 1/CP.1, sec. 2, 34 I.L.M. at 1677; see also id. at 1676; THE
EMERGING lNTERNATIONAL REmME FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (Michael Grubb
& Dean Anderson eds., 1995).
33 Berlin Mandate, supra note 31, Decision 1/CP.1, sec. 6, 31 I.L.M. at 1678.
34 See id. Decision 5/CP.1, 34 I.L.M. at 1685-87.
35 The main conclusions of Decision 5/CP.1 (on "Activities Implemented
Jointly Under the Pilot Phase") are: (a) AIJ between Annex I and non-Annex I
Parties will not be considered a fulfillment of current commitments; (b) no
credits shall accrue to any Party; (c) AIJ is supplemental and does not modify
the commitments of each Party under the Convention; (d) AIJ should be com·
patible with and supportive of national environment and development priorities
and require prior acceptance by the governments of the parties participating in
these activities; (e) financing shall be additional to the financial obligations of
parties included in Annex II as well as to current Official Development Assist·
ance flows. See id., 34 I.L.M. at 1685-86.
36 See Sebastian Obertilr & Herman Ott, UN/Convention on Climate
Change: The First Conference of the Parties, 25 ENVTL. PoL'Y & L. 144, 145
(1995).
37 See id.
38 See id.

Ima ed with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE

1999]

209

'JUSCANZ' countries (Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) were more cautious.39
B.

COP2: Geneva, August 1996

The second Conference of the Parties (COP2) was held in
Geneva in August 1996. Just before COP2, two important reports were published. The first was the much-awaited IPCC Second Assessment Report, which confirmed, for the first time, that
. anthropogenic GHG emissions were part of the cause of climate
change.40 The SAR also analyzed scientific evidence concerning
the rise of sea levels and the increase in the average global temperature over the last 100 years. As the IPCC warned, "future
climate change will be dominated by human influences unless
and until the composition of the atmosphere is stabilized."4 1 The
second report, published in concomitance with COP2, was a
study by the WHO on the consequences of climate change on
human health.42 The report forecasted an increase in malaria
and other tropical diseases together \vith a rise in malnutrition
and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases.43 The publication of
these two reports brought further confirmation that global warming was an important environmental issue. The reports also created momentum for negotiators to reach an understanding on
new measures to be adopted.
Another important event that helped shape COP2 was the
U.S. delegation's announcement that it had shifted positions and
that it now supported legally binding commitments.44 The
United States produces over twenty percent of the world's energy related C02•45 Thus, its new position had an important impact on the likelihood of success of a legally binding agreement
to actually reduce GHG emissions.
39

See id.

40 See supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
41 FRED PEARCE, EXPLAINING CLIMATE CHANGE:

A WWF 0VERVJE\V OF
NEw SCIENCE 1 (1996) (quoting the IPCC).
42 See World Health Organization, Climate Change and Hzmzan Health (July
9, 1996) <http://www.who.org/press/1996/pr96-48.html>.
43 See id.
44 See William F. O'Keefe, In Defense of Skepticism, Address at the Economic Club of Detroit (Nov. 18, 1996) [hereinafter O'Keefe Address] (commenting on President Clinton's support of legally binding commitments)
(transcript available at <http://www.api.org/globalclimate/1detroit.htm>).
45 See Rudy Perkins, Note, Electricity Deregulation, Environmental Externalities and the Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REv. 903, 1016 (1998).

THE
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These c;liverse events created a particularly fruitful situation
for those parties that supported more stringent commitments. At
COP2, the parties, for the first time, were ready to discuss more
stringent commitments. At the end of COP2, the parties "took
note" of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration (Geneva Declaration), although they did not formally "adopt" the Declaration.4 6
The Geneva Declaration states that the parties intend to negotiate a legally-binding protocol or other legal instrument to be approved at the third Conference of the Parties (COP3). 47 This
Declaration reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the FCCC.
The Geneva Declaration endorses and recognizes the SAR
as "the most comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the
science of climate change, its impact and response options now
available." 48 The Declaration states that the SAR should provide the "scientific basis for urgently strengthening action at the
global, regional and national levels ... [to] reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases."49 After Geneva, the hope was that COP3
would result in "policies and measures . . . [and] quantified legally-binding objectives for emissions limitations and significant
overall reductions within specified time-frames."50
C.

COP3: Kyoto, December 1997

COP3 took place in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. The
negotiations at COP3 proved to be quite difficult and conflicts
among different parties arose. 51 The Conference did, however,
result in a protocol with legally binding commitments to reduce
GHGs within a specific time-frame. Nevertheless, many parties
were dissatisfied with the final outcome.s2
Between COP2 and COP3, the Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin
Mandate (AGBM) met three times to agree on the most impor46 See MICHAEL Z. CurAJAR, Geneva Declaration Affirms Scientific Basis
for Action, CLIMATE CHANGE BULL., 3d Quarter 1996, at 1, 1; see also Report
of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session, 2d Sess., Annex, at 71,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (1996).
47 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session, supra
note 46, at 'li 8.
48 Id. at 'l[ 2.
49 ld.
50 Id. at 'l[ 8.
51 See Brendan P. McGivern, Introductory Note to Conference of the Par·
ties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, 29.
52 See id. at 22.
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tant points of the protocol.53 Parties wishing to submit a proposed protocol or other legal instruments to the Secretariat had
to do so by January 15, 1997. Proposals called for different timing and quantity of reductions, as well as varying measures to
implement reductions in GHGs.54 A particularly contentious issue was the role developing countries should play in the effort to
curb GHG emissions.ss
The Kyoto Protocol,5 6 the end result of COP3, provides for a
total reduction of GHG emissions of five percent below 1990
emissions for industrialized countries.57 This reduction is averaged over the years 2008-12.58 The Protocol specifies different
reduction limits for the various parties involved. The European
Union agreed to reduce its emissions by eight percent, the
United States by seven percent, and Japan by six percent.s9
Other parties have only stabilization goals, while three parties
(Australia, Iceland, and Norway) are allowed to increase their
emissions.60 Policies by which such reductions will be obtained
were not fully discussed. Further meetings are to address these
important issues.
The Protocol left people on both the environmental and
business sides unsatisfied. Many business representatives complained that these reductions were not economically feasible.61
Some environmentalists argued that the Protocol would be insufficient to protect the earth's climate.62 Although it needs further
refining, the results are important and the Protocol sends a clear
?3 See John Lanchbery, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENVIRONMENT, Nov. 1,
1997, at 4.
54 See Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)-Meetings Report-Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate: Sixth Session & tlze FCCC Subsidiary Bodies {last modified Dec. 1, 1997) <http://www.erin.gov.au/portfolio/csdl
climatefmternational/agbm6.html>.
55 See McGivern, supra note 51, 37 I.L.M. at 26.
56 Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
57 See id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33.
58 See id.
59 See McGivern, supra note 51, 37 I.L.M. at 24.
60 See id.
61 See, e.g., Global Climate Coalition, Fuzal Agreement: More Tlzan3 Million
Lost Jobs, Higher Costs for Food, Housing, Transportation, 5 CUl\fATE WATCH
BRIEF 1 (Dec. 10, 1997) <http://www.globalclimate.org/watchldecl0·97.htm>.
62 See, e.g., Greenpeace: Climate Agreement Endangers the Climate (Dec. 11,
1997) <http://www.greenpeace.org/-climate!kdatesldecember11.html>.
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sign that nations are able to agree on certain reductions of
GHGs. 63

III
NoN-GOVERNMENTAL AcroRs IN THE FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
The climate change negotiations established a precedent for
the involvement of non-governmental actors in the negotiation of
international treaties. Non-governmental groups participated in
various degrees throughout the entire process of the climate
change meetings.64 The input and scientific contributions of
NGOs were important to the development of the FCCC.
Articles 4.1(i), 7.2(1), and 7.6 of the FCCC address the role
of non-governmental organizations. Article 7.6 establishes the
rule for admission to proceedings, stating:
[A]ny body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters
covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless
at least one-third of the Parties present object. 65
Article 4.l(i) recognizes that NGOs are important to stimu~
lating and increasing public awareness on climate change.66 It
states that all parties shall "promote and cooperate in education,
training and public awareness related to climate change and en~
courage the widest participation in this process, including that of
non-governmental organizations. " 67 Article 7 .2(1) addresses the
issue of supervision of the implementation of the Convention by
the Conference of the Parties, stating that the COP shall "seek
and utilize, where appropriate, the service and co-operation of,
and information provided by, competent international organiza~
tions and intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies. "68
NGOs were involved in the negotiations of the Convention
from a very early stage and provided a different perspective from
government actors. During the negotiations, NGOs were al63 See McGivern, supra note 51, 37 I.L.M. at 29 (scheduling further discussions for late 1998 in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
64 See Doherty, supra note 19, at 199.
65 FCCC, supra note 3, art. 7.6, 31 I.L.M. at 862.
66 See id. art. 4.1(i), 31 I.L.M. at 856.
67 Id.
68 ld. art. 7.2(1), 31 I.L.M. at 861.
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lowed to participate in formal meetings as observers and could,
during plenary conferences, intervene from the floor for an allotted amount of time.69 Non-governmental organizations also
made fruitful use of their scientific expertise in climate change
and utilized the mass media skillfully.70 At COP2, the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) adopted
a resolution that requested -the Secretariat to study a more efficient mechanism to allow NGOs increased access to the
Convention.n
A. Environmental Non-governmental Organizations in the
Climate Change Debate

Environmental NGOs began to participate in the negotiations of the Climate Change Convention at a very early stage and
continued to play a major role throughout the COPs.n Approximately 100 representatives of thirty ENGOs attended the Conferences of the Parties. At the intermediate meetings, fewer
ENGO delegates tended to participate; their attendance often
depended upon the types of issues to be discussed at a meeting.73
The most influential and active ENGOs were advocacy groups
representing both 'mainstream' (World \Vide Fund for Nature
(WWF) and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)) and 'deep
ecologist' (Greenpeace and Sierra Club) ideologies, from both
international (Greenpeace) and national (Ozone Action and
EDF) perspectives. Certain groups, such as the EDF, came to
69 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, U.N.
FCCC, 1st Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4(b), at 2 n.l, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/
1995/2 {1995); see also id. Provisional Agenda Item 4(e), at 1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/
CP/1995/3 (1995); Doherty, supra note 19, at 207.
70 See Doherty, supra note 19, at 201.
71 In the following meeting in March 1997 in Bonn, however, the study for
an NGO consultative mechanism was postponed to the next session. See Report
of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on the U'cJrk of
Its Second Session, U.N. FCCC, 2d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 7, at 11,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/1996/4 (1996).
72 See generally GARETH PoRTER & JANET WELSH BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PoLmcs (1995) (defining ENGOs and offering an analysis of their
history and development); see also Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-governmental
Organizations in the Development of International Environmental Law, 6S CHI.KENT L. REv. 61 (1992) (explaining how NGOs have e"-panded their influence
in the international environmental sphere).
73 For example, only 34 representatives participated in AGBM3, while about
90 went to ABGM6 in Bonn in March 1997. See Norz-Govemmental Organizations (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/events/sbfeb97/
ngo.htm>.
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the negotiations with significant expertise in litigation and international treaty drafting. Many research institutes and project-focused NGOs were also present.
NGOs that played an important role in the evolution of the
negotiations include:
Climate Action Network (CAN): a coalition of ENGOs involved in the negotiations of the Climate Change Convention.
CAN is divided into regional groups, including Africa, Europe,
Asia, Latin America, and the United States. As an umbrella organization, CAN coordinates the positions of NGOs during negotiations and expresses the views of its members.74
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF): a mainstream ENGO
based in the United States that deals mostly with policy and legal
issues. EDF was an important player in the negotiations because, contrary to most other ENGOs, it supported marketbased economic measures.75
Greenpeace: an international advocacy ENGO with a deep
ecologist ideology. Greenpeace is well known for its spectacular
actions and outspoken methods.'6
Ozone Action: a small, deep ecologist ENGO based in the
United States with its headquarters in Washington, D.C. It is the
only ENGO discussed in this Article that is not a member of
CAN.77
Sierra Club: a deep ecologist, North American ENGO.
Worldwatch Institute (WWI): a research institute ENGO,
heavily involved in the negotiations on climate change. It is an
environmental advisor to the Business Council for Sustainable
Energy (BCSE), an industry group formed by representatives of
renewable energy sources and natural gas.78

74 See Climate Action Network, About CAN (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://
www.climatenetwork.org/#About CAN>.
75 See Environmental Defense Fund, About EDF: EDF at a Glance (visited
Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.EDF.org/AboutEDF!b_atglance.html>.
76 See PoRTER & BRoWN, supra note 72, at 51.
77 See Ozone Action, Background and Publications, Staff and Board of Directors: 1996, 1997, and 1998 Funders (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.ozone.
org/back//.html>.
78 See Worldwatch Institute, Worldwatch Mission (visited Feb. 16, 1999)
<http://worldwatch.org/wi/index.html>; see also The Business Council for Sustainable Energy, Council's Environmental Advisory Committee (visited Feb. 16,
1999) <http://www.bcse.org/enviro.html>.
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World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF): an apolitical, mainstream NGO based in Switzerland but active worldwide.7 9
Other ENGOs, such as Friends of the Earth and the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), also participated in the negotiations to varying degrees. ENGOs unanimously support the
view that global warming is a reality caused mostly by human
activities, such as industrial emissions, agricultural practices, and
deforestation. ENGOs support the conclusions of the IPCC contained in the SAR80 and have sponsored alternative studies that
promote early action to avoid serious consequences to people
and nature in the near future. 81 ENGOs assert that the threats
the Earth is facing are serious and that irreversible damages will
result from inaction. For example, Greenpeace's Report on
Global Warming states that "the prospects of the future environmental security being compromised by global warming are now
so real as to make adoption of a precautionary response imperative ... [P]olicy-makers should be clearly aware that waiting in
perpetuity for better scientific data entails the real risk of waiting
until is too late."82 Bill Hare of Greenpeace International declared at COPl that "[t]he industrialized world must agree to serious reduction in C02 to avoid the financial and human costs of
increased fl.ooding."83 Similarly, the Sierra Club Board of Directors adopted a policy statement that concluded that "[t]he danger
posed to the environment by the current and projected release of
pollutants that are affecting the thermal balance of the atmosphere . . .· is so great that mitigation measures must be taken
now."84 Similar positions are held by mainstream ENGOs. The
WWF stated, for example, that "[c]limate change will have wide79 See World Wide Fund for Nature, WWF (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://
www.Pandaorg/resourcesffactsheets/generaVfct_wwf2.htm>.
80 See supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
81 Greenpeace International, for example, cited a study by Professor Pier
Vellinga of Amsterdam Free University that warned against the serious risks of
floods due to global wamling effects. See Frequently Asked Questions About
Global Wanning, Climate Change and the Greenhouse Effect § 10 (visited Feb.
16, 1999) <http://rtk.netlE10101T659> (concluding that increases in rain and
river flow, consistent with global wamring, have already occurred).
82 GLOBAL WARMING: THE GREENPEACE REPORT 460 (Jeremy Leggett ed.,
1990).
83 Gennan Utility RWE Sues Greenpeace Amid New Signs of Climate
Change {Mar. 30, 1995) <http://www.greenpeace.org/-climate/berlin1995/
index.html#report4>.
84 Sierra Club, Protect America's Environment: For Our Families, For Our
Future (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/ozone.html>.
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ranging and mostly damaging impacts on human health.... We
cannot afford to continue 'business-as-usual.' Changing course
will not be easy, but is necessary.''BS
In general, ENGOs tend to focus on sector-specific measM
ures and they only partially support market-based approaches.
Most ENGOs support specific carbon-free fuels and legislative
tools. For example, the Sierra Club supports an increase in the
current Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard,
more energy efficient heating, cooling and lighting systems, inM
creased performance from home appliances and industrial maM
chinery, and better insulated buildings.86 Sierra Club also
campaigns for the removal of subsidies for fossil fuels and nuM
clear power, and the increased use of safe alternative technoloM
gies, such as wind and solar power.87 Similarly, Greenpeace "is
working to shift global energy dependence from environmentally
dangerous sources of energy, such as fossil fuels and nuclear enM
ergy, to ecologically sustainable solar energy. Greenpeace wants
industrialized countries to convert their current energy generatM
ing systems to renewable technologies at a minimum of 3% per
year.''88 It strongly supports the use of solar power but opposes
the further use of natural gas and nuclear power.89
Other ENGOs support more general approaches. The
NRDC recommends incentives for alternative energy, especially
fuels for transportation, and an increase in fuel ef:ficiency,9o The
EDF does not support particular measures, but instead emphaM
sizes the need to achieve the goal of cutting emissions instead of
focusing on the path chosen to get there. 91 Both the EDF and
the NRDC support the use of natural gas as a substitute for more
carbon intensive fuels. 92 The WWF sponsored a study on measM
85 World Wide Fund for Nature, Conclusions (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://
www.panda.org/resources/publications/climate/Health_Issue/page9.htm>.
86 See Patricia Glick, Global Warming: The High Costs of Inaction (visited
Feb. 16, 1999) <http://tamalpais.sierraclub.org/global %2dwarming/inaction.
html>.
!r7 See id.
88 The Greenpeace International Climate Campaign (visited Feb. 16, 1999)
<http://www.greenpeace.org/-climate/climatesum.html>.
89 See id.
90 See Daniel A. Lashof, Cool Solutions for Global Warming (on file with
author).
91 See Environmental Defense Fund Strategic Plan (visited Feb. 16, 1999)
<http://www.edf.org/pubs/strategicplan/>.
92 See Robert E. Thhnke, Kicking America's Oil Habit (visited Feb. 16,
1999) <http://www.edf.org/pubs/edf2Dletter/199111%5Fhabitat.html>.

Ima ed with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

1999]

NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE

217

ures that the European Union could adopt to reduce emissions to
the level proposed by the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS). Its approach uses a variety of measures including increasing efficiency standards and the use of renewable energy
sources.93
Environmental NGOs disagree, to a certain extent, as to the
kinds of action that should be taken to address the issue of climate change. These differences are most visible in their choices
of timetables, targets, policies, and measures. Some ENGOs support decisive actions and drastic cuts in fossil fuels, while others
support market-based approaches and more varied actions. For
example, CAN-U.S. supported the proposal of the AOSIS to reduce 1990 emissions by twenty percent by the year 2005.94 The
EDF agreed to a maximum temperature increase of one degree
Celsius per century and maximum GHG concentration of 450
parts per million.95 However,, differences did exist within the
U.S. coalition. The Sierra Club, for example, asked for more
stringent commitments from the United States and proposed a
twenty-five percent reduction target by the year 2005.96 Other
ENGOs considered the AOSIS target unrealistic because of the
short time left to the year 2005, but they still politically supported
it.97

93 See World Wide Fund for Nature Climate Change Campaign, Climate Solutions: Growth with Less Energy (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.panda.orgl
climate/solutions>. Ozone Action published short position papers in support of
the IPCC cost-benefit analysis and urged actions to implement measures to cut
emissions. See Ozone Action, Ozone Action: Global Wanning Page (visited
Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.ozone.org/page20.html>. Some ENGOs, however,
do not agree on cost-benefit analysis. Sierra Club criticizes the cost-benefit approach because it puts a price on goods that cannot be priced (like the loss of
human life, social distress caused by severe weather, and the loss of biodiversity). Sierra Club also criticizes the use of discounting and aggregation, and
claims that discounting undervalues the costs of global warming on future generations and that aggregating results undermines the fact that the effects of
global warming vary considerably in every region. See Glick, supra note 86,
<http://tamalpais.sierraclub.org/global%2dwarming(maction.htm1Wfrue>.
94 See Carol Werner & Jennifer Morgan, Cities Endorse AOSIS Protocol,
ECO, Mar. 30, 1995, at 1.
95 See Interview with Karan Capoor, Policy Analyst, Environmental Defense Fund, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 1997).
96 See Sierra Club, We Must Act Now to Curb Global Wamzing (visited Feb.
16, 1999) <http://www.sierraclub.orglnews/global-warmingl0005.html>.
<n See Interview with Christopher Flavin, Senior Vice President, World watch
Institute, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 1997).
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The flexible targets and multi-annual emissions budgets proposed by the U.S. delegation were very controversial among environmental NGOs. The majority of ENGOs supported
stringent measures and fixed targets and timetables, while others
supported the U.S. proposal of a multi-annual emissions
budget.9s The U.S. proposal for Kyoto provided for ten-year
budgets for C02 that each Annex I country would achieve individually.99 In doing so, each country would be able to borrow
(with a penalty) from subsequent years if it needed to reach its
commitment. The proposal allows trading of C02 emissions permits if a country has a surplus of them after meeting its own commitments.t0o The EDF especially supports this proposal and
helped to define it.1o1
Most ENGOs also agree that developed countries should be
more responsible for cutting GHG emissions. Kirsky Hamilton
of Greenpeace International suggested that "[i]t is up to the developed world, which produces 75% of the world's man-made
C02 emissions, to make these cuts, and help developing countries
make the switch to renewable forms of energy, such as solar energy."102 Peter Otinda of Climate Network Mrica noted that
"negotiations on the problems of global change must take cognizance of its socio-economic causes . . . . [A]ny approach that
ignores this issue of equity is bound to fai1." 103 Recent developments, however, show that some ENGOs agree that developing
countries should be included in some form of stabilization
agreement. 104

98 See Interview with Kelly Sims, Science Policy Director, Ozone Action, in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 1997) (stating that EDF supports the U.S. proposal).

99
10o
101

See id.
See Obertiir & Ott, supra note 36, at 147.
See Interview with Cliff Wood, Climate Action Network, in Washington,

D.C. (Jan. 21, 1997).
102 Greenpeace International, Greenpeace Climbers Still on Smokestack: In·
dustrialised Nations Are Climate Killers (Mar. 28, 1995) <http://www.green·
peace.org/-climatelberlin1995/index.html#report2>.
103 Peter Otinda, Negotiate But . . . No Solution Without Equity Considera·
tion, ECO, July 8, 1996, at 3, 3.
104 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Global Warming: Dispatches from
the Climate Summit at Kyoto (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.edf.org/issues/
Kyoto.html> (stating that one of the six critical elements indicated by EDF for
environmental success includes "a path leading toward participation by devel·
oping nations").
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B. Intra-group Relations Among ENGOs
The ENGOs that were more active in the climate change
negotiations were mostly advocacy ENGOs, although some
groups belonging to other categories (such as operational and research institutes) were active as well. ENGOs were generally
united on issues and shared the same position on a relatively substantial number of issues. At the negotiations, they also shared
facilities and collaborated in the publication of ECO, a pro-environmental newsletter. Most of the ENGOs that participated in
the climate change discussions were members of CAN and
worked in a coalition for the negotiations of the Convention.
Scientific papers were reviewed by CAN and a common position
was elaborated by the group.1os
Although advocacy ENGOs shared most of their characteristics and positions, some tensions did exist among them. Environmental NGOs can be divided.into 'mainstream' groups and
'deep ecologists,' 106 and the tensions that surfaced were generally
attributable to this ideological difference. Disagreements among
mainstream and deep ecologists have persisted for a long time
and are not confined to the climate change issue. Some mainstream groups are criticized for their past efforts to cooperate
'vith governments and business groups. The EDF, for example,
was admonished for trying to cut special deals on the 1990
amendments to the U.S. Clean Air Act without consulting other
ENGOs.l07 Sometimes, for negotiating purposes, ENGOs pretend to be in more disagreement than they really are. For example, Greenpeace can play "good cop/bad cop" with the EDF in
order to obtain a more favorable outcome at negotiations.lOS
Because of these ideological differences, members of CAN
at the FCCC reached conclusions only on limited issues and not
on the complete spectrum of issues related to the Convention.
While member-NGOs could agree on a final target and timetable
for reduction, as well as the decision to support the AOSIS proposal, they could not reach agreement on the measures and policies by which parties would achieve this goal. The EDF, a
105
106

See Interview with Cliff Wood, supra note 101.
See WALTER A. RosENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL

PoUTICS AND Poucv

28-32 {1995).
107 See Interview with Kelly Sims, supra note 98; see also Interview with Kalee Kreider, Program Director of Climate/Energy Campaign, Greenpcacc, in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 1997).
108 See Interview with Kalee Kreider, supra note 107.
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mainstream ENGO, supported market-based mechanisms.1°9
Deep ecologist ENGOs, like Greenpeace and the Sierra Club,
disagreed. Greenpeace favored the use of renewable energies,
especially solar,11° while the Sierra Club pushed for an increase
in CAFE standards.111 Similarly, ENGOs did not have a uniform
position on joint implementation. EDF favored joint implementation among Annex I parties,112 while the Sierra Club did not
accept it under any circumstances.113
C. Business Non-governmental Organizations in the Climate
Change Debate
Business NGOs are interest groups that unite several companies to campaign for a specific point of view. Many BNGOs
were involved in the negotiations of the Climate Change Convention and their presence in the debate increased as the creation of binding commitments became more real. Eric
Holdsworth from the Global Climate Coalition noticed that
"sometime after COP1, industry representatives became more
numerous than environmental NGOs representatives."114 Since
then, the gap has only widened. At some more recent negotiations, there were twice as many industrial representatives as
there were ENGO representatives. 115 At the Sixth Session of the
Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM6) in Bonn in
March 1997, there were more than 150 representatives from
about thirty-five different industry groups in attendance, as com109 See Global Wanning Treaty: Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on
Agric., Forestry and Nutrition, 105th Cong. (Mar. 5, 1998) (statement of Fred
Krupp, Executive Director, Environmental Defense Fund), available in 1998
WL 8992982.
110 See The Greenpeace International Climate Campaign (visited Feb. 16,
1999) <41ttp://www.greenpeace.org/climate/climatesum.html>.
·
111 See Global Climate Negotiations: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
lnt'l Relations, 105th Cong. 49,50 (1997) (statement of Daniel Becker, Director,
Sierra Club Global Warming and Energy Program) (explaining the Sierra
Club's support of CAFE standards).
112 See Environmental Defense Fund, Global Wanning: Dispatches from the
Climate Summit at Kyoto (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://W)VW.edf.org/issues/Ky·
oto.html>.
113 See Risky Business: Trading Away Our Responsibilities (visited Aprilll,
1999) <http://tamalpais.sierraclub.org/global %2dwarming/riskybusiness.html>.
114 Interview with Eric Holdsworth, Deputy Executive Director, Global Cli·
mate Coalition, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 1997).
115 See id.

Ima ed with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE

1999]

221

pared to only ninety representatives from about twenty-five
ENGOs.
In the debate on climate change, some BNGOs represent
specific industry sectors with similar interests in the outcome of
the negotiations,l16 while others represent industrial interests in
general, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development
(WBCSD). Since COP2, BNGOs have endorsed two separate
statements: one from mainstream industry groups and one from
industry groups representing renewable energies, cogeneration,
natural gas, and energy efficient technologies.l17
The most important economic sectors and the BNGOs that
represent them are the following:
Coal and oil companies and the energy intensive industries 1 1B
are represented by many relatively conservative BNG0s.n9 The
most conservative group is the Climate Council.120 Another conservative group is the Global Climate Coalition (GCC),121 based
in Washington, D.C., which has financed numerous economic
116 The Global Climate Coalition (GCC) represented oil companies and
heavy energy users, and the European Business Council for a Sustainable Future represented European renewables.
117 See Workshop on Consultative Mechanisms for Non-Governmental Organization Inputs to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (visited Nov. 7, 1998) <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/docsJl996/sbsta!

misc02.htm>.
118 These include alunlinum producers, the iron and steel industry, paper
companies, and plastics producers.
119 In many cases, companies are members of more than one group representing diverse views. There are at least two reasons that explain this phenomenon. First, multinational companies can have more than one interest (e.g., a
company can produce fuels from oil, gas, and coal while simultaneously seeking
to expand its chemicals business); thus, they may need to be present on more
than one sector-specific BNGO. Second, their position may vary from country
to country, and sister companies of the same multinational groups can choose,
as they are normally free to do, to be members of differentially conservative or
open business NGOs.
120 Dan Pearlman, an attorney who represented the group at the negotiations, tried to prevent any kind of agreement and helped OPEC representatives
in writing interventions and in suggesting ways to block and delay decisions.
See Fred Pearce, Playing Dirty in Kyoto, NEW SCIENnST, Jan. 17, 1998, at 48.
121 The GCC has 42 board members and 17 general members. The board
members include Air 'fransport Association, Alunlinum Association, Inc., Atlantic Richfield Coal Company, Chemical Manufacturers Association, Chevron,
Exxon, Ford, General Motors, Texaco, and others. The general members, who
pay $2500 rather than $20,000, include Amoco, BHP :Minerals, Dow Chemicals,
Goodyear Tlre & Rubber Company, and Shell Oil Company. The GCC was
named by the Climate Action Network as one of the "dirty dozen" companies
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studies on the potential impacts and costs resulting from GHG
reductions. The American Petroleum Institute (API) represents
the positions of American oil companies on many issues.1 22 API
actively participated in the negotiations and financed a study to
analyze the costs of implementing reduction targets. 123 Less conservative BNGOs representing mostly fossil fuel, transportation,
and energy intensive sectors include the ICC, the WBCSD, and
the U.S. Council for International Business (USCIB).124
The chemical sector125 is represented by the International
Climate Change Partnership (ICCP),126 a group based in Virginia
which supports long-term comprehensive goals and marketbased solutions to climate change.127

who have "played an obstructive role in the climate change negotiations." Who
Is the Worst of the Worst of the 'Dirty Dozen'?, ECO, Dec. 4, 1997, at 4, 4.
122 The Executive Vice President of API, William O'Keefe, gave a speech
before the Economic Club of Detroit in which he strongly attacked President
Clinton's commitments to legally binding emission reductions and recommended taking a skeptical view of the science of climate change and the costs
on the economy. See O'Keefe Address, supra note 44.
123 See Interview with Russell 0. Jones, Senior Economist, American Petroleum Institute, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 12, 1997).
124 It is sometimes difficult to differentiate among the BNGOs and their positions since some BNGOs are members of other BNGOs. The GCC, for example, is a member of the U.S. Council for International Business, and API is a
member of GCC. These groups sometimes share part of their top managers.
O'Keefe, for example, is Executive Vice-President of API and Chairman of the
GCC.
125 The chemical sector became involved in the climate change debate at an
early stage, as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and their substitutes were named as
gases that have an ozone-depleting effect. CFCs contribute significantly to
GHG warming and their influence is studied carefully by the scientific community. The Montreal Protocol, which since 1987 has been ratified by more than
150 countries, provides for a complete phase-out of CFCs. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 23, art. 2, 26 I.L.M. at 1552; see also INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON·
MENTAL LAw 492 (Michael R. Molitor et al. eds., 1991). Scientists have
demonstrated, however, that substitutes developed by industry to replace CFCs
have warming potential as well. See Hilary F. French, Learning from the Ozone
Experience, in STATE oF THE WoRLD 151 (Lester R. Brown et al. eds., 1997).
126 The ICCP, like the Climate Council, is based in a law firm. Members of
the ICCP include 3M Company, Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute,
AT&T, BP America, Dow, Dupont, Elf Atochem, European Fluorocarbon
Technical Committee, and General Electric. More conservative chemicals industries such as Dow Chemical are also members of the GCC.
127 See International Industry Coalition Urges Governments and Industry to
Join to Create Effective Global Climate Change Process, PR NEwsWIRE, Mar. 6,
1996, available in WL, ALLNEWSPLUS Database.
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Insurance and re-insurance companies,t28 also present at the
negotiations, are interesting examples of companies that would
suffer the consequences of the projected global warming.t29
However, the insurance and re-insurance sectors do not share a
common position on the issue of climate change. American companies are not involved in the negotiations. European insurance
and re-insurance companies, on the other hand, are interested in
the negotiations and in the issue of climate change. In 1990, declarations from the European insurance and re-insurance companies already linked :financial losses from bad weather conditions
to the change in climate patterns.13° European companies, however, are "active observers" rather than fully participating lobbyists. They do not lobby strongly for particular positions and
have not distinguished themselves from the positions of other industries present at the negotiations. 131

128 In the last decade, insurance and re-insurance industries e:-:perienccd unprecedented losses due to weather disasters, although the IPCC could not confirm that anthropogenic climate change had a role in these disasters. See SAR,
supra note 6, § 17. In the future, climate change has the potential to destabilize
the insurance market if the patterns of climatic change are not understood and
the risks are misinterpreted or underestimated.
129 There are more than $2 trillion of insured assets in the U.S. coastlines
alone. See Mark Hertsgaard, Insurance Finns, Banks Battle Big Oil, SACRA·
MENTO BEE, Feb. 4, 1996, at Forum 1.
130 H.R Kaufman, General Manager of Swiss Re, declared in 1990 that
"[t]here is a significant body of scientific evidence indicating that last year's
record insured losses from natural catastrophes was not a random occurrence.
Instead it may be the result of climatic changes that will enormously ex-pand the
liability of the property-casualty industry." JEREMY LEGGE'IT, GREENPEACE
INTERNATIONAL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE INsuRANCE INDUSTRY: Sou.
DARITY AMONG THE RisK CoMMUNITY? 27 (ca. 1993) (on file With author); see
also Munich Re, 1996 Another Year of Natural Catastrophes (visited Feb. 16,
1999) <http://www.munichre.com/press/pressl961223_eng.htm> (containing a
Dec. 23, 1996 press release from Munich Re, the largest re-insurance company
in the world, concerning losses from natural catastrophes).
131 Both Swiss Re and Munich Re, the world's two biggest reinsurance companies, planned to send observers to COPl. See US ll!Surers Meet with Vice
Presidel!t on Climate Change, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE REP., Feb. 24, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 8443827. Sinillarly, Carlos Joly, of UN! Strorebrand, Norway's largest insurer, declared that "[g]lobal warming to many of us in the industry is not a question of if it \viii happen, but what is happening now." Global
Wanning Spurs New Developments in ll!Surance, Banking, GLOBAL WARMING
NETWORK ONUNE, July 18, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2265919.
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The renewable energy sector132 benefits the most from a policy of reduced global dependence on fossil fuels.1 33 The renewable sector is represented by the United States Business Council
for Sustainable Energy (USBCSE). This group was formed in
1992 with the help of some ENGOs, particularly the World
Watch Institute. In Europe, the European Business Council for a
Sustainable Energy Future (e5), created in 1996, represents energy efficiency, cogeneration, and renewable energy companies.
Renewables are still a relatively small industry, but their presence at the negotiations was important to demonstrate that the
industry was not completely united and that more than one point
of view needed to be considered for business.
Before the publication of the Second Assessment Report in
1995, BNGOs often contested the scientific findings with respect
to climate change. BNGOs questioned the validity of the findings, the proceedings, and the integrity of the IPCC in an attempt
to discredit the scientific conclusions.t34
132 The renewable sector includes solar and wind energy producers, cogeneration, energy efficiency, and natural gas companies. See NANCY K. KuBASEK &
GARY S. SILVERMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238 (1994).
133 The renewable sector began to get involved in the negotiations rather recently, and their presence among other industry groups is acquiring importance.
At COP2, the renewable industry for the first time presented an separate intervention from the floor at the Plenary session. Similarly, at AGBM6-the following meeting-industry groups representing renewables and natural gas
presented a separate statement. At AGBM6, the BCSE stressed its link to
other BNGOs and declared that its members "agree with much of the business
community in many issues, but not always on climate change and energy policy," so as to remind the others that it was a member of the industry despite its
lobbying for emissions reductions. Paul E. Metz, Statement Before AGBM6, the
Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate, Sixth Session, Bonn, March 5, 1997, on
Behalf of the United States Business Council for Sustainable Energy and the European Business Council for a Sustainable Energy Future-e-to-the-power-of-5
(visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.e5.org/pages/st-01e.htm> [hereinafter Statement Before AGBM6].
134 Professor Patrick Michaels of the University of Virginia declared that
scientists supporting the issue of global warming resisted critical exantination of
the subject, and George Laver of the Atlantic Richfield Company said that the
U.N. had deleted passages of skeptical scientists in their reports. See Alan Kovski, Battle Against Global Wanning Moves to Geneva This Week, OIL DAILY,
Mar. 5, 1996, at 4. Similarly, Frederick Seitz, President Emeritus of Rockefeller
University and Chairman of the George C. Marshall Institute, claimed that he
had "never witnessed a more disturbing corruption of the peer-review process
than the events that led to this IPCC report." Frederick Seitz, Editorial, A Major Deception on 'Global Wanning', WALL ST. J., June 12, 1996, at A16. EN·
GOs harshly criticized these attempts to discredit the science behind global
warming. See, e.g., Kelly Sims, Gone Completely Crazy, ECO, July 8,1996, at 1.
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The publication of the SAR, with its first-time recognition
that human behavior has an impact on global warming and the
endorsement of its conclusions by the international community,
shifted the focus in the debate over science. Even though some
groups still criticized parts of the science of climate change, the
existence of climate change was acknowledged by many of the
BNGOs as well as by the international community.l3 S Questions
remained on the extent of climate change, on the validity of future projections, and on the weight and importance of those uncertainties that still surrounded the issue. There was, therefore, a
need for further scientific research. The GCC, for example,
agreed after the IPCC that the SAR was the most comprehensive
report on climate change, but still emphasized the need to conduct further research before the parties took any action to combat climate change. It stated that "[e]xisiting scientific evidence
does not support actions aimed solely at reducing or stabilizing
greenhouse gas emissions."136 According to the GCC, any action
to prevent or reduce GHG emissions would have such a major
impact on the U.S. carbon-based economy that a greater understanding of the climate system was necessary before the parties
embarked on any r~duction.137 Similarly, the USCffi, a member
of the ICC, said that more time was needed to understand the
issue.l38 These groups supported more scientific research on issues like carbon captured by oceans and a more detailed quantification of temperature variation and sea level rise. 139 These
ECO also reported that "[a]ttempts by groups such as the Global Climate Coalition, representing the interests of coal, oil and automobile companies working
in concert with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to discredit the IPCC report are
bluntly self-serving. The attack on the IPCC and its Lead Authors are just plain
lies." No Discernible Impact on Emissions, ECO, July 8, 1996, at 1, 2. ENGOs
also stated that "the IPCC has provided more information about human induced climate change than has been known about any previous global threat"
and that "the GCC's misinformation campaign is unrelenting." Sims, supra, at
1.
135 For example, William O'Keefe, Chairman of the GCC, acknowledged that
the "scientific theory is valid" and that "the potential for enhanced global climate change is real," but he added that "the degree of likely change and the
best responses are profoundly uncertain subjects." Kovski, supra note 134, at 4.
136 Global Climate Coalition, GCC's Position on tlte Climate Issue (visited
Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.globalclimate.orglmission.htm>.
137 See id.
138 See Interview \vith Norine Kennedy, Vice President of Environmental Affairs, United States Council for International Business, in New York, N.Y. (Jan.
16, 1997).
139 See id.
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BNGOs suggest that waiting before acting will not result in damages to the environment or the population because uncertainties
still exist and technical developments will make emissions easier
to control. . For example, William O'Keefe declared that "[w]e
could wait 20 to 25 years to take action until scientific uncertainty
is lessened. " 140
Other BNGOs have argued that, while more research would
be useful, some immediate action is necessary. Kevin Fay, Executive Director of the ICCP, shared some doubts concerning the
"relationship between the emissions of these [greenhouse] gases,
their retention in the atmosphere, and the potential effects on the
planet's climate." 141 However, he called for an active role of industry, science, and policy makers to formulate "a successful solution to managing the risk associated with global climate
change." 142 The WBCSD Annual Review of Activities stated
that although the scientific debate about the effect of the 'greenhouse gases' on global warming will continue, "it is prudent for
business to play its part by looking for ways to reduce emissions
of those gases."143 Furthermore, one of the seven principles for
which the eS decided to lobby at the negotiations was that
"[s]cientific results of international climate and research such as
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) should
be the basis of rational climate policies. "144
Similarly, some European insurance and re-insurance companies shared the position of ENGOs on the scientific evidence
of climate change and on the need for timely action to reduce
emissions. These companies agreed that climate change represents a major threat to the environment.14S Since 1989, in fact,
the insurance sector has experienced a major increase in expenditures due to natural catastrophes. 146 Following COPlin Berlin,
the position of some of the biggest Eirropean insurers and reinsurers (like Munich Re and Swiss Re) has moved to favor
Sims, supra note 134, at 1.
International Industry Coalition Urges Governments and Industry to Join
to Create Effective Global Climate Change Process, supra note 127.
142 /d.
143 World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Climate and Energy (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.wbcsd.ch/climatel.htm>.
144 Energy: Business Forms Sustainable Energy Council, BuR. ENV'T, Feb. 20,
1996, at 1, 2-3.
145 See Global Warming Spurs New Developments in Insurance, Banking,
supra note 131.
146 See Insurers Call for Action, ECO, July 10, 1996, at 3.
140
141
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· measures reducing emissions.147 The collection of evidence and
the involvement of insurers in the debate have also been influenced by the heavy lobbying of Greenpeace, which sponsored effective conferences for insurers prior to the Berlin conference.
In a report issued by British insurers for the British government,
published concurrently with COP2, insurers declared that they
were "at risk of a major increase in claims over the next 50 years
as a result of global warming." 148 Swiss insurance executive H.R.
Kaufman declared that a "[f]ailure to act would leave the insurance industry and its policyholders vulnerable to truly disastrous
consequences."149 At COP2, during a workshop organized by
the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), fiftyeight representatives from insurance and re-insurance companies
from all over the world issued a position paper calling for "early
substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions." 15D
European and U.S. insurance and re-insurance companies,
however, approach the issue of climate change in significantly
different ways. 151 Companies in the United States are addressing
the problem of losses first by trying to understand climatic cycles
better through an analysis of the risks involved in climatic events
and then by adjusting the prices of insurance to cover those
risks.152 In contrast, the European insurance and re-insurance industry is researching the causes of global warming and becoming
involved in the process that is leading to more stringent timetables and targets on GHG emissions.
Most of the BNGOs support the application of binding commitments to developing countries.153 In contrast, the priority of
ENGOs is to agree on effective commitments for the developed
world, and only at a second stage do they introduce commitSee id.
Edwin Unsworth, Exposure Heats Up: Climate Change to Raise ClaimsStudy, Bus. INs., July 15, 1996, at 17. The report, entitled "Review of the Potential Effects of Climate Change to the U.K.," forecasts a potential six-percent
increase in mean \vinter wind speeds in southern Britain by 2050. See id.
149 Christopher Flavin, Storm Warnings, WoRLD WATCH, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at
10, 11.
150 Insurers Call for Action, supra note 146, at 3 (commenting on the "notable exception of the U.S.").
151 See Interview with Frank Nutter, Re-insurance Association of America, in
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 12, 1997).
152 See id.
153 See, e.g., Global Climate Coalition, GCC's Position on tlze Climate Issue
(visited Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.globalclimate.org/mission.htm> (ex-pressing
GCC's support for active participation by developing countries).
147

148
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ments for the developing world. 154 BNGOs that have an interest
in stringent environmental regulations (like the BCSE) also support a stricter approach regarding developing countries' commitments, even while they agree that Annex I parties should be the
·first to engage in emissions reduction.tss To explain their positions publicly, some BNGOs use projected emissions of C02 by
developing countries. Conservative BNGOs have sometimes
stressed the issue of American economic well-being. For example, after the Kyoto agreement, William O'Keefe, Chairman of
the GCC, stated that "[o]ur folly will bestow enormous economic
advantages on our international competitors at the expense of
American business, workers, farmers and consumers. For the
first time in history, the United States would allow a foreign body
dominated by developing countries to restrict and control the
economy of the United States." 156 Other BNGOs emphasize dif. ferentiated targets and timetables. According to the ICCP, for
example, the negotiation process should include "commitments,
possibly differentiated, for developed and developing countries."157 The e5 stresses the need for "more technology transfer" and that "North-South transfer is essential" to the success of
any reductions in developing countries.158 Similarly, David Mills,
Vice-President of the International Solar Energy Society, has
proposed a plan of action to introduce renewable energy technology to developed countries and on a voluntary basis to developing countries. 1S9
The industry sectors that are likely to suffer the biggest
share of economic loss are industries that produce or release the
highest share of C02• Such industries include coal and oil companies, energy companies, transportation, vehicles manufactur154 See, e.g., Risky Business: Trading Away Our Responsibilities (visited April
11, 1999) <http://tamalpais.sierraclub.org/global %2dwarming/riskybusiness.html> (explaining the Sierra Club's preference for preliminary emissions
reduction in industrialized countries).
155 See Interview with Kirk Brown, Policy Director, Business Council for Sus·
tainable Energy, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 1997).
156 Global Climate Coalition, Industry, Labor Congressional Leaders Express
Outrage as U.S. Negotiators Fail to Defend U.S. Interests, 5 CLIMATE WATCH
BRIEF 1, !J[<J[ 6-7 (Dec. 11, 1997) <http://www.globalclimate.org/watch/dec11·
97.htm>. The article also states that three million jobs could potentially be lost
in the U.S. if the Kyoto Protocol is ratified. See id.
157 International Industry Coalition Urges Governments and Industry to Join
to Create Effective Global Climate Change Process, supra note 127.
158 Energy: Business Forms Sustainable Energy Council, supra note 144, at 3.
159 See David Mills, Kick Starting Green Energy, ECO, Apr. 3, 1995, at 3.
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ers, and energy intensive industries (e.g., producers of heavy
metals and chemicals). Industry groups that represent these sectors have produced careful studies on the costs of GHG reductions. The GCC financed a study of the economic consequences
to industry of a reduction of C02 by twenty percent by 2005 (the
AOSIS proposal).160 The study concludes that reducing C02 by
twenty percent by 2010 would reduce the GDP of the United
States by between 1.5 and 3.5 percent.161 This situation is financially equivalent to a tax of $200-$300 (in 1990 U.S. dollars) per
ton of C02 emitted.162 Such an impact would obviously have
negative consequences for the U.S. economy. In addition to the
GCC, the American Petroleum Institute and the International
Chamber of Commerce (along \vith its American affiliate, USCIB) emphasize the costs of C02 reductions and suggest that
more studies should be carried out on both science and economics before engaging in legally binding commitments.163
Other BNGOs take different positions on the issue of cost,
interpreting the results of the IPCC in a more urgent fashion.
Among the few sectors that have produced cost-benefit analyses
of the impact of climate change on their business, the most important one is the insurance and re-insurance industry. European insurance and re-insurance companies are beginning to use
cost-benefit analysis as an element to explore the possibility of
their participation in the negotiations. In fact, some European
members of the industry have recognized that climate change is
having a major impact on the industry and claim that reducing
GHG emissions \viii be beneficial to the economy.I64 The e5 also
shared the view that the costs of reducing C02 \vill eventually be
less than the costs of climate change itself.16S This position is partially explained by the interests of the companies that are members of e5. Most of them are involved in technologies related to
renewable energies, cogeneration, and natural gas. Thus, they
would benefit substantially from both a reduction of C02 emis160 See WHARTON EcoNOMETRic FoRECASTING Assoc. GROUP & H.
ZINDER & Assocs., A REvmw oF THE EcoNor.uc lMPACIS OF AOSIS-T"''PE
PRoPOSALS To LIMIT CARBoN DIOXIDE Er.ussioNs (1996) (study prepared for
the Global Climate Coalition).
161 See id. at 26.
162 See id.
163 See O'Keefe Address, supra note 44 (arguing that more studies should be
done before entering legally binding commitments).
164 See Unsworth, supra note 148, at 17.
165 See Statement Before AGBM6, supra note 133.
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sions and the consequent increased use of fewer carbon intensive
sources of energy. The e5 quoted studies of the International
Network for Environmental Management and concluded that
"[o]verall saving energy is several times more labour intensive
and less capital intensive than providing energy supply.... [It]
would free up investment for more productive purposes" and
thus would be beneficial for the economy.166
Business NGOs have diverse views on the issue of timetables and targets. Their positions can generally be divided into
three groups. The first group supports only voluntary actions,
and does not support any form of fixed target or timetable for
reduction. GCC's John Schlaes, for instance, thinks that
"'targets and timetables' is the wrong approach." 167 The GCC
declared that it was "extremely disappointed" that the United
States would support quantified legally binding objectives,t6s and
is pushing instead for flexible incentive-based rules.t69 Many industries prefer flexible timetables and voluntary actions, and
some have already begun to implement such programs as an example of good will.17° Most industry groups fear that fixed
targets will result in strict policies by national governments that
will require substantial financial sacrifice and will ultimately result in economic loss. 171 The GCC sponsored a study on the appropriate timing of reductions in GHG emissions that concluded
that "focusing .on mandatory near-term reductions may not be
Energy: Business Forms Sustainable Energy Council, supra note 144, at 3.
William Miller, Heating Up, INDUS. WEEK, July 1, 1996, at 55, 56.
168 See Lira Behrens, U.S. Agrees to Legally Binding Targets for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FED. LANDS, July 22, 1996, at 6, available
in 1996 WL 8697142.
169 See Miller, supra note 167, at 56.
170 Such voluntary programs exist in the U.S., Canada, and Australia. See
William L. Fang, The U.S. Climate Change Program: Voluntary GovernmentUtility Partnerships to Mitigate Greenhouse Emissions (last modified June 4,
1998) <http://www.ji.org/iuep/ieabonn.shtml> (describing the U.S. program and
nanring the participating companies).
171 On this issue, ENGOs conclude that "[w]ithout a legally binding target,
countries will not only miss the stabilization aim, but will be unable to stabilize
GHG concentrations at a safe level for humankind and the environment." Delia Villagrasa & Jennifer Morgan, Targets Not Aims, ECO, July 17, 1996, at 4, 4.
Considering how little the developed countries actually achieved in trying to
implement the non-legally binding agreement reached in Rio, this conclusion
makes a strong point. See, e.g., Robert Hornung, Voluntary Failures, ECO, July
12, 1996, at 2 (reporting on the insufficiencies of the Canadian Voluntary Challenge and Registry Program).
166

167
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cost-effective in light of the specific characteristics of global climate change."172
The second group emphasizes the need to get involved in the
development of the Kyoto Protocol and agrees to support some
kind of target and timetable. Industry groups such as the ICC,
the USCIB, and the API have similar positions and stress voluntary actionsP3 Recently, there has been a shift by industry towards this position as more evidence of the effects of climate
change emerges and as industry seeks an economically sensible
position.
The third group agrees \vith ENGOs and supports fixed
timetables and targets. These industry groups generally represent renewable energy and natural gas companiesP4 Both the
BCSE and eS support the AOSIS proposal.
The coal and oil industries especially fear that tight regulations will increase industry costs too much. Irl Engelhart, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive of Peabody Holding Co.,
declared that "if global climate change restrictions are imposed,
the coal industry will not have the opportunity to adjust." 175 One
commentator has suggested that many U.S. industry groups find
the measures supported by ENGOs, such as "manufacturing-efficiency standards, carbon tax on fuel use and fuel-efficiency standards for vehicles," to be "anathema" and instead favor
voluntary agreements like joint implementation.176 The GCC
proposal, for example, concentrated on improving energy efficiency in developing countries.177 The priorities indicated by the
WBCSD in implementing the FCCC are cost-effective actions
172

DAVID HARRisoN, JR. & ALBERT L. NICHOLS, RECENT EVIDENCE ON

THE APPROPRIATE Tn.nNG OF REoucnoNs IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS at

E-1 (1996) (study prepared for the Global Climate Coalition by National Economic Research Associates (NERA)).
173 See American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Adions to Address
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (last modified Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.api.orgl
globalclimate/page3recommendlink.htm>; The Busuzess Recipe for Combating
Climate Change, Bus. WoRLD (Dec. 4, 1997) <http://www.iccwbo.org/Business_World/1997!The_Busines_recipe_for.htm>.
174 See Green Plan Boost for U.S. Gas Use, lNT'L GAS REP., Oct 29, 1993, at

7.
175 U.S. Coal Chief Concedes Gas Edge, lNT'L GAS REP., May 13, 1994, at 2, 2
(stating that Peabody Holding Co. controls 10% of U.S. coal production and is
the largest U.S. coal producer).
176 Miller, supra note 167, at 56.
177 See Global Climate Coalition, GCC's Position on the Climate Issue (visited Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.globalclimate.orglmission.htm>•
.J
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(including energy efficiency and joint implementation) and a focus on the development, implementation, and dissemination of
new technologiesP8 Similarly, the ICCP supported "marketbased" measures that would ensure that "no individual industries" are "discriminated against." 179 ICCP called for policies
"that encourage the innovative use of existing technologies that
can minimize greenhouse gas emissions, and the development of
even better new technologies." 18° The BCSE recommended that
"policies should be market-based." 181 Some industries consider
joint implementation a cost-efficient way to reduce emissions at
the globallevel.182
D. Intra-group Relations Among BNGOs
The relationship between BNGOs differs from the intragroup relations of ENGOs in two aspects. First, the discussion
on climate change is dominated by one section of BNGOs
(formed mostly by fossil fuels, the energy sector, and chemical
groups) that has a substantial interest in lobbying the negotiations. The other sectors are active listeners that usually do not
engage substantially in the negotiations. Second, there is one minority group that supports views very different from the majority
of industries, and these views are having a substantial impact on
the negotiations. This minority is composed of renewable, energy efficiency, cogeneration, and natural gas companies that
support near-term targets.ts3
BNGOs share common positions on some of the elements of
the FCCC. All BNGOs, for example, support market-based in178 See International Business Action in Climate Change Executive Summary
(visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://194.209.71.99/printpdf/report%20to%20cop2%
2Djune%2020%20ibacc.doc>.
179 International Industry Coalition Urges Governments and Industry to Join
to Create Effective Global Climate Change Process, supra note 127. The ICCP,
whose majority of members have negotiated the Montreal Protocol on Sub·
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and have acquired experience on environmental treaty negotiations, also stressed the importance that no industry is
"singled-out." See id.
180 Id.
181 John G. Hemphill, Six Principles for a Sustainable Energy Future, CLIMATE CHANGE BuLL., 3d Quarter at 7, 7 (recommending the recognition of
clean energy alternatives).
182 The WBCSD, ICC, GCC, USCIB, and ICCP all support JI in all FCCC
parties. The BCSE is the only BNGO that prefers the implementation of JI only
within Annex 1 parties. See Interview with Kirk Brown, supra note lSS.
183 See Statement Before AGBM6, supra note 133.
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struments rather than command-and-control measures.184 Positions on this and similar issues are also linked to the
characteristics of industry groups as representative of economic
actors.
While some differences existed on the appropriateness of
measures and timetables, they did not develop into tensions
among the groups; the majority were united in the negotiations.
The situation might change for future COPs if other groups become involved more visibly in the negotiations. For example,
should European insurers decide to lobby for commitments, the
balance of positions would shift substantially. Environmental
NGOs claimed that industry was showing signs of increased division at AGBM6.185 Business NGO representatives contested this
claim and commented that industry was not as divided as environmental NGOs portrayed them.186
Some tensions on the substance of the negotiations existed
only within a defined minority that did not support most of the
views of other industry groups. Since COP2, this minority has
produced separated position statements at plenary meetings.
This is a significant development for the negotiations, but this
sector is small compared to the majority group. Additionally, the
minority group has declared that "they agree \vith much of the
business community on many issues. "187

E. Inter-group Relations: Existing Collaborations and
Cooperation Between Environmental and
Business NGOs

ENGOs and industry groups are not monoliths. They are
formed from diverse organizations and express a variety of views.
Relations among members of industry groups and ENGOs can
184 A command-and-control (CAC) regulatory approach is based on an environmental standard set by the government and enforced by legislation. CAC is
typically set for siinilar categories of polluting sources. The efficacy of CAC has
been questioned since it does not differentiate among emissions-reduction costs
that various polluters encounter and since it imposes the same standards to all
polluters. The market-based approach used economic instruments, like emissions permits, to reduce emissions. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B.
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, in FoUNDATIONS OF ENVmONMENTAL
LAw AND PoLICY 133 (Richard L. Revesz ed., 1997).
185 The dynamic among industry lobbyists was compared to the "last days of
the Roman Empire." Industry Splits, ECO, Mar. 7, 1997, at 3, 3.
186 See Statement Before AGBM6, supra note 133.
187 Id.
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be characterized in different ways. Because climate change is
still a political issue, relations are tense, although some cooperation between ENGOs and specific companies or groups is developing.tss At the COPs, groups mostly lobbied and developed
their own positions. There was a notable shift in position by industry to a more environmentally sensitive approach to the climate problem, especially as the scientific aspects became more
certain. This shift will probably become more noticeable as the
discussion moves toward policies to be adopted to implement Kyoto reductions. In the past, most of these attempts were initiated
by ENGOs, with support from some BNGOs.
This section will first analyze the attempts to increase cooperation and dialogue made by research institutes and conflict-resolution NGOs. Second, it will examine the efforts of the WWF
and Greenpeace to involve industrial sectors in the negotiations.
Some ENGOs and BNGOs do not see the necessity for cooperation at this stage, while a few are united and cooperate in
many ways. Some advocacy ENGOs do not want to have contact
with industry groups, particularly with those representing fossil
fuel producers.1 89 These ENGOs think that their positions are so
far apart that discussion is not possible. Also, some ENGOs consider talking with fossil fuel representatives a compromise that
they do not want to make. This was especially true for deep ecologist ENGOs like Greenpeace and Ozone Action.t 90 Some ENGOs have tried to have discussions in the past, but have failed;
thus, they feel disillusioned by the prospect of future talks. The
Sierra Club, for example, participated in discussion groups on
transportation issues with car manufacturers and concluded that
there were no issues on which the groups could agree.1 91 While
no industry groups have declared that dialogue is useless, some
ENGOs have openly taken this view.1 92 Nonetheless, attempts at
188 For example, "(w]ith EDF, BP will develop a pilot program, setting performance targets in 10 of its operating units, and, within two years, set a voluntary company-wide emissions linlit, years ahead of treaty requirements." British
Petroleum and EDF Efforts Boost Climate Talks, 28 EDF LETTER 1, 'JI1 (Nov.
1997) <http://W\Vw.edf.org/pubs/EDF-Letter/1997/Novlb_BP.html>.
189 See Interview with Kelly Sims, supra note 98.
190 See Interview with Kalee Kreider, supra note 107.
191 See Interview with Ann Mesnikoff, Associate Representative, Sierra
Club, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 1997).
192 See Interview with Michael Toman, Senior Fellow and Director, Re·
sources for the Future, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 11, 1997).
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dialogue and cooperation have come almost exclusively from the
ENGO community.
On the opposite side of the spectrum, some companies are
so close to ENGOs that members of ENGOs sit on their Boards
of Directors.193 This is the case for industry groups that represent renewable energies, cogeneration, energy efficiency, and
natural gas. In fact, ENGOs also helped form some of these
groups. The WWI and the EDF, for example, were instrumental
in the creation of the BCSE.l94 During the negotiations, few attempts were made to reach out to members of the opposite side.
Business and environmental NGOs did participate together in
conferences and roundtables on a few occasions, but these ostensibly collaborative efforts were generally used by each group to
reiterate their own positions. More concrete attempts to enhance dialogue, cooperation, and relations were addressed by
some research institutes and conflict resolution NGOs. The EDF
is an interesting example because its policy statements reflect its
concerns for environmental goals and economic flexibility. The
EDF tries to "make people want to walk into the system" of
GHG restrictions and believes that it should attempt dialogues
with industry groups.195 Tradable permits and joint implementation could represent a starting point for dialogue between industry groups and some mainstream ENGOs. There were also
attempts, exclusively from ENGOs, to involve new BNGOs in
the COP negotiations. These efforts were directed to sectors that
were not principal stakeholders at the negotiations and had the
goal of engaging these sectors in pro-environment lobbying.
Greenpeace addressed the European insurance and re-insurance
sectors.196 The WWF approached the building, transportation,
and heavy industry sectors.197 Ozone Action contacted the tourist industry.198
Some differences among the business and environmental
groups are embedded within the characteristics of the groups.
See Interview with Christopher Flavin, supra note 97.
See id.; Interview with Kirk Brown, supra note 155.
195 Interview with Karan Capoor, supra note 95.
196 See THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR CLIMATE CHANGE,
supra note 32, at 83.
197 See Interview with Peter DeBrine, Program Officer at the Climate Energy
Program, World Wide Fund for Nature (U.S.), in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23,
1997).
198 See id.; see also Interview with Kelly Sims, supra note 98.
193

194
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ENGOs claim to support moral positions and are therefore considered to be thinking about the long-term. 199 ENGOs also feel
that they represent both the environment and the public at the
negotiations.200 On the other side, BNGOs feel they are allowing the economy to grow and are providing wealth essential
to world· development. These positions are difficult to compromise and should be kept in mind when trying to negotiate. Also,
some differences are the results of factors that are independent
from the positions on the negotiations on climate change, such as
the negotiating position of a national government or variances in
cultural attitudes.
The conflict-resolution ENGOs were the most active among
the environmental groups in trying to find common ground for
collaboration. Some are characterized by neutrality and belong
to the project-oriented category (such as the Keystone Center),
while others try to facilitate dialogue but have a defined position
on the issue (such as the Center for Clean Air Policy). The Keystone Center is a skilled group that has mediated contentious environmental issues over the years. The Keystone Center
"enables decision makers from government, the environmental
community, industry, and citizen organizations to come together
to clarify issues in disputes" by facilitating mutual understanding
at the local, national, and international level.201 The Center is
becoming more involved in the negotiations of the Convention
and will possibly address the issue of national commitments
among diverse stakeholders in the future.z02
The Center for Clean Air Policy was also involved in discussions with energy companies and tried to develop common policies with them.203 Research institutes, like Resources for the
Future and the World Resource Institute, took part in studies on
scientific and economic issues linked to climate change and disseminated their findings to industry groups.204 While it is too
early to judge the effectiveness of such actions, they are interestSee Interview with Kelly Sims, supra note 98.
Seeid.
201 THE KEYSTONE CENTER, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1994-1995).
202 See Interview with Tim Flaherty, Senior Policy Analyst, The Keystone
Center, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 12, 1997).
203 See Combating Climate Change Proves Profitable for Cities, NATIONS CITIES WKLY., Sep. 29, 1997, at 13.
204 See Worldview Climate Change: Most Believe in Warming Threat-Poll,
GREENWIRE, Aug. 4, 1998, available in WL, ALLNEWSPLUS Database.
199

200
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ing examples of collaboration that may become fruitful. The pro~
cess should be monitored closely to follow its development.
Another kind of relationship among representatives of different groups was developed by three ENGOs: Greenpeace, the
WWF, and Ozone Action. The three groups contacted repre~
sentatives from different industry sectors to explain the dangers
and possible solutions brought by the Convention. Greenpeace
addressed the European insurance and re-insurance industries,zos
which has been receptive to their advice.206 Greenpeace organized numerous conferences to address the issue \vith the risk sec~
tor, published numerous papers, and researched the issue
extensively.207 European insurance and re-insurance companies
are not fully involved in the negotiations, but should they decide
to do so, they will change the equilibrium of industry groups considerably. American insurance companies are not involved in the
issue, though some attempts have been made to involve them.
The WWF organized roundtables involving different industry secto:rs to create a critical mass of support for measures to
curb climate change. The first roundtable took place in Copen~
hagen on January 20, 1997. Government officials, e::r."Perts, and
industry representatives participated. The roundtable concluded
that there was a "sufficient[ly] firm basis of scientific knowledge
about climate change to justify policymakers and economic interests devising strategies and programmes to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases."208 It also concluded that measures to combat
climate change "could convey economic advantages in view of
the considerable potential for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
atJow cost, or at a profit" and offer "advantages to first~mov
ers."209 Other sectors identified for participation are transportation and heavy industry (e.g., chemical and energy intensive
industries).210
Similarly, Ozone Action involved the tourist sector in the
dialogue on climate change. The first meeting \vith members of
this group was held February 10-14, 1997. The "David and GoliSee Interview with Kalee Kreider, supra note 107.
See Hertsgaard, supra note 129.
207 See, e.g., LEGGEIT, supra note 130.
208 Oaude Martin, WWF Round-Table on Climate Change 2 (Jan. 20, 1997)
(unpublished summary of a roundtable on climate change) (on file with
author).
209 Id.
210 See id.
205

206
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ath campaign" was carried out on the East Coast of the United
States with the purpose of highlighting "the impacts of global cliM
mate change on the communities in the United States and to
make connection between local sea-level rise and the current inM
temational negotiations on climate change."211 Participants included several university professors, two ambassadors of AOSIS
states, and members of Ozone Action. 2 12
IV
METHoDs oF AcnoN

While their interests differ, environmental and business
NGOs have used similar methods to influence the outcome of
climate change negotiations. First, many lobbied and pressured
governments and international organizations to adopt a position
in line with their interests.213 Second, NGOs influenced the
agenda by defining or redefining issues in ways that reflected
their point of view.214 Third, groups submitted sections or entire
drafts of conventions to the Conferences of the Parties.zts Both
environmental and business NGOs predominantly used the first
and second methods outlined above. The third approach was utilized less extensively at the negotiations, and when it was, it was
usually used only by ENGOs.zl6
A. Lobbying

Environmental and business NGOs were active lobbyists in
Berlin, Geneva, and Kyoto, just as they previously had been in
Rio. For example, approximately 1000 representatives of NGOs
and other private interests groups were accredited as observers at
Berlin.217
211 John Passacantando, Summary, in FRoM SEA To SHINING SEA! THE IM·
PAcrs oF CuMATE CHANGE SEA-LEVEL RisE oN THE EAsT CoAST 2 (Ozone
Action ed., 1997).
212 See id.
213 See infra Part IV.A.
214 See infra Part IV.B.
215 See PoRTER & BRoWN, supra note 72, at 50·66 (giving examples of be·
havior of industry groups and NGOs during other international environmental
negotiations).
216 See id. at 54 (arguing that a method solely characteristic of ENGOs is to
"monitor the implementation of conventions and report to the secretariat and I
or the parties").
217 The exact number of groups admitted as observers to COP! was 165, re·
suiting in a total of 979 NGO representatiyes. This number is even more im·
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The groups lobbied in rather distinct ways. ENGOs were
very outspoken and highly visible. They communicated their positions through daily publications, innovative forms of protests,
and criticisms of the positions with which they did not agree. The
ENGO lobbying effort had two main objectives: to educate the
public about the dangers of climate change and to persuade government representatives to take decisive action on the issue.
Climate Action Network, the international network of ENGOs, published a daily newspaper, ECO, during the proceedings
of all three COPs and other intermediate specialized meetings.21s
They distributed numerous copies of ECO at no charge to the
representatives. The newspaper summarized the events of the
day, criticized specific governmental and industry delegations,
and suggested productive options. In Berlin, for example, ECO
denounced an informal paper by the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development which indicated a possible
agreement between the United States and the European Union
to delay agreements on legal commitments to reduce C02 emissions.219 This secret agreement was contrary to the E.U. official
position and ministerial mandate. ECO's public denunciation of
the agreement was central to its failure. In fact, after the publication of the article, the E.U. returned to its original position.22o
The newspaper also suggested possible alternatives to fossil
fuels and new possibilities for developing the Convention.221 As
ECO had such a wide distribution, it is highly possible that governmental representatives read it and adopted some of the viewpoints as their own. Moreover, the media that attended the
events received copies of ECO, and it quickly became a primary
source of information for press coverage of the COPs.
pressive when compared with the number of Parties present (117) and the total
number of Party representatives (757). See Directory of Participants, U.N.
FCCC, Conference of the Parties, 1st Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/1995/Inf.S/
Rev2 (1995).
218 See generally Hilary F. French, Reforming the United Nations to Ensure
Environmentally Sustainable Development, 4 TRANSNAT'L L & CONTE..'.tP.
PRoBs. 559, 598 (1994) (arguing that such newspapers have become "mainstays
of the international negotiating process").
219 See EU Mandate Trashed?, ECO, Mar. 30 1995, at 1.
220 See Obertiir & Ott, supra note 36, at 145.
221 See Don't Trade Tech: Transfer for II, ECO, Mar. 29, 1995, at 3 (e:-;plaining the difference between technology transfer and joint implementation); see
also Two Transportation Options, ECO, Apr. 7, 1995, at 3 (describing car sharing and automobile fuel economy standards as examples of policies to reduce
C02 emissions).
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The second way that ENGOs lobbied at the negotiations included visible and effective protests both inside and outside the
conference center. Three activists from Greenpeace, for example, climbed a 190-meter tall chimney of a German coal power
plant in Frimmersdorft (near Cologne) the day before COPl began and spent twelve days on the chimney.222 Fifty activists
chained themselves to the coaches and limousines used by delegates to reach the convention center in Berlin to protest the GCC
and the slow pace of the negotiations at the climate change
conference.223
Finally, ENGOs lobbied by identifying specific positions that
they considered particularly threatening and denouncing them.
During COPl, for example, ECO published a daily short paragraph called "Weltshumerz," where the author made fun of actions by industry groups and government representatives that
expressed conservative views about the development of the Convention.224 A similar ECO feature was developed during COP2
under the title "Uman."225 Using a similar technique, Greenpeace published a note on the Internet before the Geneva conference accusing the car industry of lying about the measures
they planned to implement to protect the environment and comparing the public statements of car manufacturers with the reality
of their behaviors.226
Business NGOs, on the other hand, kept a low-profile and
lobbied in more traditional ways. They did not have daily publications and did not adopt innovative forms of protest. They tried
to reach and influence government representatives both outside
and inside negotiations. In addition to publicly stating their
views, BNGOs also organized conferences and brought scientific
experts to the negotiations. Business NGOs did not organize
many events and protests on the outside, but they were very
present inside the negotiations. They focused on lobbying a few
222 See Greenpeace Scales Chimney of Coa/fired C02 Factory (Mar. 27, 1995)
<http://www.greenpeace.org/-climatelberlin1995/index.html#reportl>.
223 See Ramesh Jaura, Environment: Protests Shake Up the U.N. Climate Meet
in Berlin, lNrER PRESs SERVICE, Mar. 30, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2260055.
224 See Weltshumerz, ECO, Mar. 28, 1995, at 4.
225 See, e.g., Leman, ECO, July 8, 1998, at 4.
226 See Greenpeace, Rhetoric Versus Reality (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http://
www.greenpeace.org/-climate/smile/dirty/6rltetoric.html> (referring to Ford,
Chrysler, Mercedes-Benz, and Volkswagen). Greenpeace also developed a prototype of a highly efficient car using as a model the model'l\vingo produced by
Renault. See id.

Ima ed with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

1999]

NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE

241

specific representatives with whom they had close relationships.
For example, the representative of the Climate Council, Dan
Pearlman, was very friendly with the representatives of oil~pro~
ducing countries, Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand.227 Other industry groups, like the GCC, the
ICCP, and the USCIB, adopted a wider, representative-oriented
approach. They distributed position papers and research results,
and organized conferences to present their different views.228
Business NGOs lobbied governmental representatives before
meetings and were very active \vithin the various meetings.
The presence of BNGOs was felt more intensively as the ne~
gotiations evolved and the FCCC began to take the shape of a
legal instrument with teeth. The need of BNGOs to make their
voices heard throughout the process became clearer. For exam~
pie, the ICCP stated that it "recognize[d] that it is industry's re~
sponsibility to work with policy makers in understanding the
changes that are occurring and could occur" and that it "in~
tend[ed] to proactively continue" its participation during the ne~
gotiations.229 Even industry groups that represented renewable
energy, the keenest supporters of mitigation measures, did not
join ENGOs in their outspoken role. At a maximum, some indus~
try groups published articles in EGO describing their activities
and held policy and technical conferences to present technologi~
cal alternatives to coal and oil technology.23o
Non-government actors also lobbied using the media, both
through the Internet and through classical mass media sources,
such as newspapers and television. ENGOs used the new tech~
nologies more masterfully than the BNGOs. On the Internet, for
example, ENGO web pages were better presented and more ac~
cessible. Greenpeace is known to have a very specialized and
modem media center where it can speedily produce high quality
television reports quickly. Also, many newspapers and special~
ized brochures were distributed throughout the negotiations.
Through the various lobbying methodologies, it is interesting
to note how the language of non-government actors differed
See Interview with Kelly Sims, supra note 98.
At the negotiations BNGOs and ENGOs had two different meeting
rooms. These rooms were also used to organize conferences where representatives of the two groups were sometimes present. See id.
12.7

228

229 International Industry Coalition Urges Governments and Industry to Join
to Create Effective Global Climate Process, supra note 127.
230 See, e.g., The International Solar Energy Society, ECO, Apr. 3,1996, at 6.

Ima ed with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

242

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 7

from one another. Greenpeace, Ozone Action, and Sierra Club
used provocative, aggressive, and sometimes moralistic language.
On the other hand, the EDF, NRDC, WWF, and BNGOs used
technical and scientific language that was generally less
aggressive.
Apart from the official mechanisms set up in the negotia~
tions, business and environmental NGOs also lobbied the confer~
ences by providing alternative evidence to representatives. Both
BNGOs and ENGOs financed their own research and substanti~
ated their demands with their findings. 23 1 They also reviewed
and criticized each other's papers.232 Scientific and policy re~
search papers were presented at the Conference by the specialists
who conducted the research, and the scientists were then made
available for question-and-answer sessions.
B. Influencing the Agenda
The second fashion in which business and environmental
NGOs influenced the FCCC negotiations was by defining or re~
defining the issues on the agenda. This activity differed from lobbying insofar as it was directed mostly to the definition and re~
definition of specific issues rather than general issues of policy~
making.
The principal way in which business and environmental
NGOs influenced the agenda was by using their official access to
the Convention to intervene at the negotiations. The Convention
provided for a limited intervention capacity by non-governmen~
tal representatives. 233 Each group could present its point of view
from the floor at the plenary for an allocated amount of time.
One intervention was usually made by ENGOs and one by
BNGOs. At COP2 in Geneva, industry made two separate inter~
ventions: one represented the point of view of the majority of
industry groups (like the GCC and ICCP), and the other was
given by representatives of the renewable energy sector (including the USCSE and the e5). After the COPl and COP2 negotia~
tions, the GCC claimed particular success in influencing the
debate, stating that it had been able to bring into the agenda
231

See, e.g.,

WHARTON EcoNOMETRIC FoRECASTING

Assoc. GRoUP & H.

ZINDER & Assocs., supra note 160.
232 See id. (comparing and contrasting existing macroeconomic modeling
evaluations of the potential impact of emission reduction proposals).
233 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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items that had previously been neglected by the parties.234 Such
items included the amount of emissions of developing countries
in the future and the economic costs of cutting emissions.23s
C. Presentation of Draft Protocol Provisions
The third way NGOs influenced the international debate
was to submit parts or entire drafts of a protocol to the Convention for consideration by the parties. This method was used during the FCCC negotiations in different ways. Under the FCCC,
NGOs could not propose drafts or parts of drafts directly to the
Secretariat during negotiations.236 However, industry groups and
ENGOs could influence the proposals of parties by participating
in their drafting processes, prior to their submission to the Secretariat. This was relevant at international and national levels. At
the international level, the most relevant example was that of the
Foundation for International and Environmental Law (FIELD),
a British research and advocacy NGO that represented several
small island states at the negotiation.237 At a national level, the
U.S. delegation's proposal for a Kyoto Protocol was influenced
by research and proposals by the EDF, especially with respect to
the issues of tradable permits and tradable emission systems.23s
CoNCLUSION
This study has pointed out that the relationships between
different NGOs are complex and varied. Relations are not limited to intra-group interactions, as might have been expected, but
they include inter-group interactions as well. ENGOs are generally more interested in contacting BNGOs than vice-versa. Relationships between the business sector and ENGOs are usually
left to the initiative of a single company, as the example of the
collaboration between BP and EDF illustrates. Among different
ENGOs, more moderate groups try to collaborate with BNGOs
and specific sectors of the industry. The WWF, for example, addressed different groups and held conferences to sensitize indus234
235
236

See Interview with Eric Holdsworth, supra note 114.
See id.
See FCCC, supra note 3, art. 15, 31 I.L.M. at 868 (providing only that

"Parties" may propose amendments to the Convention).
237 FIELD is a research institute linked to the School of Oriental and African
Studies in London.
238 See Interview \vith Karan Capoor, supra note 95; see also Interview with
Kelly Sims, supra note 98.
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try to the problem of climate change, with the goal of finding
common ground on which to collaborate. A different group of
ENGOs, which included Greenpeace and Ozone Action, addressed sectors that are not yet involved in the negotiations, such
as tourists and insurance industries. Their purpose was to illustrate the potential dangers of climate change for the specific
sectors.
Intra-group relations are also complex, as NGOs represent
different world views that negotiate from various perspectives.
Not all ENGOs supported the same policy measures to reduce
GHG emissions, and BNGOs defended different approaches to
the issue of climate change. There was a basic common denominator, however, that allowed each NGO to function within its
group.
Environmental and business NGOs behaved in significantly
different ways during the negotiations at the COPs. Figure 1 summarizes the different methods adopted by BNGOs and ENGOs
during the negotiations, according to the analysis presented in
Part IV.
1
AcnoNs OF ENGOs AND BNGOs AT
THE NEGOTIATIONS
FIGURE

METHoDs

AND

ME1HOD

A en oN

BNGOs

ENGOs

Lobbying

Contacts with
representatives

Yes

Yes

Daily publications

No

Yes

Definition and redefinition of issues
Submission of drafts

Protests

No

Yes

Use of mass media

Yes (but less than
ENGOs)

Yes

Interventions at
Plenary

Yes

Yes

Directly

No

No

Indirectly

Yes

Yes

Business NGOs came to lobby particular representatives
and used classical lobbying methods. ENGOs skillfully utilized
different media and made their positions very visible.
This can be explained in different ways. First, environmental
and business NGOs had different constituencies. ENGOs attempted to educate the public on the effects and threats of climate change. For BNGOs, lobbying some governmental
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representatives was just as effective when applied in a soft manner. Although BNGOs needed some support of public opinion,
ENGOs relied more heavily on public support for their existence. The use of mass communication to influence public opinion by industry groups was common mostly in the United States.
Mobil, for example, advertised almost weekly in national newspapers such as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal to
publicize its support for a thorough cost-benefit analysis before
decisions were made.239 ENGOs rarely used similar newspaper
campaigns and preferred different media such as the Internet to
reach what was probably a different kind of audience.
Second, a substantial part of these differences can be attributed to the intrinsically different characteristics of the actors. Industry representatives are expected to be more business-like,
which means that they are not expected to engage in public protests like chaining themselves to cars. ENGOs, however, are expected to behave in more creative and progressive ways.
It is difficult to know how much reconciliation is possible
among the different views endorsed by the environmental and
business NG-Gs. Some ENGOs find their roots in moral values,
and they suggest that they act from a moral point of view.
BNGOs, on the other hand, feel that they help provide economic
wealth to the people and that they are responsible to their individual shareholders. These differences are important to understand when analyzing the various approaches to climate change
that business and environmental NGOs confront, address, and
react to. Also, these differences influence the views of business
and environmental NGOs on the entire issue of climate change.
In the future, we can likely expect more dialogue among the
groups as actions to reduce GHG emissions are taken and the
negotiations on political issues are overcome.

239 See, e.g., The Environment: It's Everyone's Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
1998, at A27 (explaining in an advertisement by Mobil that emissions need to
be reduced safely and economically).
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